It is a pleasure and honor to have an opportunity to react to the Loy/Morford analysis of agon. They have produced an ambitious and rich description of our human fascination with contest, one that extends from the Homeric Greeks to modern times. It is a story of commonalities and differences. The authors hypothesize that one can find threads of similarity across the ages and thus too "vestiges" or "residuals" of early forms of agon in today's post-agonal sporting world.
I will be reacting to this thesis from perspectives generated by my own academic training in philosophy. In the short space allotted to this commentary, I attempt to do two things -first, identify implications of some conceptual distinctions, and second, point out normative questions raised by the Loy/Morford analysis. These comments will be far more suggestive than definitive. However, I trust they will demonstrate the fruits of multidisciplinary discourse -in this case between historian-sociologists, on the one hand, and a philosopher, on the other.
Conceptual distinctions and the alternate stories they generate
Loy and Morford provide definitions at the start of their essay while admitting they are entering a "linguistic quagmire." Different things are called sport. Different definitions of contest can be found in the literature. Because of this, Loy and Morford need to tell readers, by providing operational definitions, what they mean by these terms.
Some philosophers would raise a cautionary flag at this point because, on their view, this is not simply a linguistic problem (though it is certainly that too). Rather it is more fundamentally a conceptual problem. When individuals do not perceive important differences, for instance, between A and B, they are inclined to call them the same thing. This happens in the English language when we say, "I love you." Different kinds of love are similar … but also different. Susan loves ice cream, her dog, her sister, and her significant other but not in the same way. Thus, for the sake of clarity, additional verbs would appear to be needed. Interestingly, some nonEnglish lexicons have them.
2 In short then, conceptual clarity should help us avoid linguistic quagmires.
Loy and Morford cannot be sidetracked by conceptual analyses. That would involve them in a different project and result in a different paper. For their purposes, they need to identify a cultural phenomenon, define it, and proceed to see how it varies across time and circumstance. This is precisely what they do. A contest, they say, is "a competitive activity characterized by two or more sides, having agreed-upon-rules, criteria for determining the winner, with a zero-sum outcome wherein the winner(s) takes all" (p. 12). They are interested in agonal or It is difficult to say. They clearly identify self-testing sports as one species of "agonal contests", along with "agonistic games" (e.g. basketball, football) and "sporting matches" (e.g., boxing, wrestling) (Loy & Morford, 2019, p. 55 ). Yet they cite agreement with Paul Weiss who argues that contests require displays of relative superiority in such areas as speed, accuracy, and coordination. It is difficult to understand how a mountain (the "opponent" of the climber) can meet these conditions. How could a mountain show superior speed, accuracy, or any physical attribute for that matter? Accordingly, any claims of zero-sum victory by the mountain would seem to be more metaphorical than literal. It would be more accurate to say the climber failed the "test" provided by the mountain. Self-testing may well be a very different thing than competitive striving.
Many years ago, I wrote about the distinction between tests and contests, between problem solving per se, and one of its variations -competitive problem solving (Kretchmar, 1975) . Tests and contests, I argued, are analytically distinct and experientially unique. A person can be in a test (golfing alone, trying to solve a Sudoku puzzle) and not be in a contest (golfing to beat at least one other person or entering a Sudoku tournament). However, one cannot be in a contest without also facing a test. Contests, in other words, are logically dependent on tests.
This is so because contesting presupposes the ability to show difference in the direction of superiority. Such differences are dependent on possibilities for variable success. Tests perform that function.
A pseudo-test that is too easy would not work for a contest because everybody would score the same -say, a perfect 100. Without an ability to show difference, a contest could not get off the ground. Likewise, a pseudotest that is too hard would be useless for agonal purposes because once again, everyone would score the samea frustrating 0. Thus, it is the challenge that is not too hard and not too easy -that is, a genuine test and the kind typically offered by golf, tennis, baseball -and war -that allows for the display of disparate skills and degrees of success. Test scores vary, thus permitting the declaration of a winner and loser.
The analytic difference between tests and contests can be further clarified by noting that competitors actually get two results at the end of a contest. First, they receive the zero-sum competitive result. They won, lost, or tied. Second, they receive a non-competitive, non-zero-sum test score. They played well, sort of well, about average, poorly, and so on. Playing well, of course, enhances chances for victory, but it does not guarantee it. The opposite can be said for playing poorly. It decreases chances for victory, but it does not require it. In sum, contest results and test scores are two different things.
This all-too-brief metaphysical exercise allows us to raise a couple of questions. What if the historical and sociocultural spotlight were turned on sporting "tests" rather than "contests", that is, on trying to solve physically demanding problems well rather than trying to solve them better than at least one other party? What story could be told then, and in what ways would it diverge from the agonal or competitive story told by Loy and Morford?
War would probably no longer serve as the best historical and prehistorical analogue for sport. Rather, it might be hunting (Carroll, 2000 track nicely onto current sporting activities -hitting targets, displaying strength and endurance, exhibiting the virtues of courage, perseverance, and (on group hunts) teamwork.
It is also likely that the values at stake in testing would be shaped differently than those found in agonal activity. Merit would accrue to those who get the right answer or a good answer, not necessarily a better answer than someone else. 4 Test norms and the experiences of others rather than contest results could be used to determine the meaning of a test score.
Let us imagine that I am a newcomer to bowling and, on my first visit to the alleys, rolled a 120. Understandably, I am not sure what that score means. I consult norms for my age group and discuss my results with others. I discover I bowled much like other neophytes. I discover that anything approaching excellence has eluded me, at least so far. I will need to practice and improve if I am to be honored as an outstanding bowler. Importantly, I learn all this without entering a contest.
Philosopher Bernard Suits (2014) privileged tests over contests. He argued that the human need to act competently is more fundamental to human well-being than any desire for competitively-gained superiority and honor. Suits claimed that human beings flourish most regularly when facing challenges for which the deployment of their skills is required.
When confronted with good problems, he wrote, we are not bored. We have something interesting to do. Suits concluded we love tests so much that, when technological progress removes many natural challenges, we invent artificial difficulties. We call them games. Of course, we can use games competitively, but that is a secondary decision and, on Suits analysis, a location of derivative value. The primary thing is the game, the challenge, the test.
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Consistent with Darwin's laws of natural selection, the primary storyline for humans (indeed all plants and animals) is one of adapting to the environment and solving the problems it presents. Some of these survival problems result in battles and contests, but at base level and most regularly they are tests. 6 Those who are able to pass tests successfully live long enough to pass on their genes. These survivors provide their offspring with phenotypes (physical traits, attitudes, potential virtues) that make for good test taking and good test scores. Human beings then are arguably the best test-takers and problem-solvers on the face of the planet. We are also pretty good competitive problem solvers too, as Loy and Morford have so well documented, but that is a different story -at least in part.
Normative judgments and value implications of the agonal story
Loy and Morford's analysis is replete with descriptive analyses of a variety of values. These include states of affairs or experiences called non-moral values, such things as enjoyment, success, heroism, competence, and the like. The authors also detail moral values or character traits, motives, and virtues such as honesty, fortitude, and killing (for the hunter) are incommensurate and thus too incomparable. Consequently, it is more accurate to say that the bear provides a variable test for the hunter. For further analysis on the nature of competition, see Kretchmar (2014) .
This question of moral progress is important because competition is thought by some to be morally problematic. (See, e.g., Kohn, 1992) . Winners produce losers. Higher rankings generate lower rankings. The honor accorded to those who win most often is not available to those on the lower rungs of the competitive ladder. The prestige enjoyed by elite athletes is unattainable by lesser contestants with more pedestrian skills. Therefore, it might be better to cooperate than compete, collaborate than fight with one another, focus on rising together commensurate with our diverse faculties than promote and celebrate one rising above the other.
Loy and Morford's analyses provide evidence for both moral degradation and progress. They agree with Huizinga that sport is less playful today than it was in the 18 th century, a period believed by Huizinga ([1919 Huizinga ([ ] 1999 to best exemplify the interpenetration of culture and play. Crass extrinsic purposes and win-at-all cost attitudes have replaced lighter and more fun-filled intrinsically-valued engagements with sport. On the other hand, Loy and Morford show sport is more symbolic today than it was in Homeric times. As a consequence, it is safer, more fully rule-governed, more gentile, less war-like.
This latter fact would count as moral progress on Pinker's criteria. Sport, in general, is far less violent today than it was, for instance, in feudal societies. Jousting is not likely to make a comeback in the 21 st century.
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Research on head injuries in football is causing many to re-evaluate the merits of this activity, especially for children. Thus, Pinker may be right. On some grounds, competitive sport is far more defensible today than it was previously.
However as noted, the erosion of the play spirit in contemporary win-at-all-costs sport could be regarded as moral regress. (See, e.g. Feezell, 2013; Schmitz, 1988.) Joy in playing is sacrificed on the altar of any number of extrinsic rewards. This also threatens the connection endorsed by MacIntyre between practices and virtues. For those pursuing external sporting goods, the "fact" of winning trumps the "quality" of the victory. Finding loopholes in rules is often considered "good strategy" or "smart play" by those who carry such instrumental attitudes onto the sporting pitch. Success, even gained by questionable means, replaces skill-based and virtuegenerated achievement.
Final conclusions about the moral status of competitive activities are difficult to draw. This is the case for reasons that are clearly featured in the analysis by Loy and Morford. The cultural and historical context of sport affects how it is conducted, what it means to its participants, what values it promotes, and overall, whether it might elevate or degrade the culture in which it exists. Many philosophers of sport (see, e.g., Simon et al., 2015;  
